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COMMENT
FCC COMPARATIVE RENEWAL HEARINGS:
THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
Government efforts to regulate the commercial broadcasting industry did
not begin in earnest until shortly after the First World War. Prior to that
tithe, anyone who wanted to establish a radio station had to do little more
than build a transmitter.' By the mid 1920's, however, it became apparent
that limited spectrum space would not accommodate all persons desiring to op-
erate broadcast stations, and that some form of federal regulation would be
necessary. Responding to this need, Congress enacted the Radio Act of
1927. 2 In drafting this legislation, its authors were guided by the principle
that the airwaves are a limited, precious resource that can be owned by no
individual. 3 To carry out this design and to bring order to the chaotic world
of broadcasting, the Act established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) with
broad powers to license stations "as [the] public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires." Subsequently, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) replaced the FRC pursuant to the Communications Act
of 1934, 5 but the core-concept of public ownership was retained. 6 In the
spirit of public control, both the Radio Act and the Communications Act
clearly stated that a licensee possessed no right to the continued use of its
assigned frequency beyond the term of its license.' Additionally, these Acts
' See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 25TH ANNUAL REPORT 11-13
(1959). Although the Secretary of Commerce did attempt to assert some degree of
control over broadcast stations before World War 1 under authority granted him by
the Radio Act of 1912, Ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, adequate regulation was impossible be-
cause this legislation never contemplated commercial broadcasting. For example, while
the Commerce Department had the power to license broadcasters, it could not assign a
location, frequency, or power limitation to them. Id.
2 Ch. 169, 44 Slat. 1162 (1927).
3 See id. at § 1, which states:
[T]his.Act is intended to regulate all forms of interstate and fOreign radio
transmission and communications within the United States, its territories
and possessions; 10 maintain the control of the United States over all chan-
nels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the
use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals, forms
or corporations, for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by
Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Id. See also 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926) (remarks of Rep. White, floor manager).
Ch. 169, 44 Stat. at 1163. The specific powers of the Commission included
the assignment of frequencies and broadcast sites, as well as the limitation of power
output. Id.
47 U.S.C. § 151 e.t seq. (1976).
" See 47 U.S.C. 301 (1976). The language in section 301 of the Communi-
cations Act is almost identical to that of section 1 of the Radio Act. See note 3 supra.
See Radio Act, Ch. 169, § I, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (text of section 1 at note 3
supra); Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 309(h) (1976) (text below).
Section 301 provides in part
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required their respective Commissions to remove any incumbent licensee at
the end of its license term and to replace it with a challenging applicant who,
in the Commission's judgement, would better serve the public. is It was be-
lieved that these provisions would act as a competitive spur to broadcasters,
encouraging them to achieve and maintain programming of the highest possi-
ble quality.
Under the rule announced in the United States Supreme Court decision
of Ashbacker v. FCC," the effective implementation of these provisions can he
achieved only if the FCC gives full consideration to all license applicants seek-
ing to operate a broadcast. frequency, even when the frequency is already
occupied by an incumbent broadcaster. Such consideration, the Ashbacker
Court held, requires a comparative hearing." In this type of proceeding
each applicant is given an opportunity to demonstrate that it can provide bet-
ter service to the community than its opponents. The FCC, after hearing evi-
dence and weighing all relevant differences between the competitors, then
must pick the one that seems best equipped to serve the needs of the com-
munity."
With one possible exception, 12 comparative hearings involving the in-
cumbent licenseholder always have resulted in the renewal of the licensee,
It is the purpose of this chapter. among other things, to maintain the con-
trol of the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign
radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not
the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under
licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be con-
strued to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the
license.
Section 304 provides:
No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant
therefor shall have signed a waiver of any claim to the use of any particu-
lar frequency or of the ether as against the regulatory power of the United
States because of the previous use of the same, whether by license or
otherwise.
Section 309(h) provides in part:
Such station licenses as the Commission may grant shall be in such general
form as it may prescribe, but each license shall contain, in addition to other
provisions, a statement of the following conditions to which such license
shall be subject: (1) The station license shall not vest in the licensee any
right to operate the station nor any right in the use of the frequencies
designated in the license beyond the term thereof nor in any other manner
than authorized therein ... ,
6 See Ch. 169, 44 Stat. at 1162 (1927) (Radio Act), and 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a)
and (d) (1976) (Communications Act).
9 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
'" See id. at 330.
" See Johnston Broadcasting v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
19
 In 1969 the FCC did replace WHDH-TV (Channel 5), Boston with a chal-
lenging applicant, but WHDH was operating on a four-month temporary license. It
had never held a regular three year license and the FCC viewed WHDH as the equiva-
lent of a new applicant. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), modified, 17 F.C.C.2d 856
(1969), aff'd sub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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provided the licensee continued to satisfy certain minimum qualifications."
To some this record suggests a bias in FCC policies favoring current licensees
over newcomers." Such a bias is arguably in contravention of both the
Ashbacker comparative hearing requirement., and of those provisions of the
Communications Act that specifically withold from a licensee any right to its
assigned frequency beyond the term of its license. Entrenched broadcast in-
terests have argued, however, that. no illegal or unfair bias exists." They
contend that some degree of preference for incumbent licensees is necessary
to ensure that incumbents who are providing satisfactory service are not dis-
placed solely on the basis of a challenger's assertion that it can do better."
This argument has proved successful in pursuading the FCC to provide pref-
erences and thereby to protect licensees from renewal challenges.
Although the FCC accepts the logic of the argument favoring some form
of renewal preference for incumbent licensees, it also recognizes the statutory
limitations on its authority to provide such preference." In Hearst Radio,
Inc.," the FCC, after discussing at length the need to provide incumbents
with some preferential treatment, was careful to add that "the foregoing dis-
cussion of renewal preferences is not to be construed in any way as giving a
licensee property rights to the use of a frequency—or any other rights or
advantages over a competing applicant ...."" Unfortunately, in spite of
persistent efforts, since Hearst, the FCC has never succeeded in establishing a
satisfactory balance between the policy considerations favoring preferences
and the statutory language discouraging reliance upon them. In addition, al-
though the courts have recognized the FCC's failings, 20 they only have con-
cerned themselves with the legal half of the equation, avoiding policy prob-
lems. Thus, while the courts have been willing to tell the FCC what it may not
do, they have given little help in suggesting alternative policies that might be
permissible. 2 ' As a result, the FCC apparently has concluded that the safest
13
 Renewal and new applicants alike must meet prescribed standards of
character, citizenship, solvency, and technical skill before the FCC may even begin to
consider whether the grant of a license would serve the public interest, convenience or
necessity. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 319(a) (1976). In addition, through its rulemaking
authority the FCC has placed absolute limits on the number and location of other
broadcast facilities and daily newspapers an applicant may own. E.g., 47 C.F.R. §§
73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1978). See generally United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1956).
' 4 See, e.g., Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 41, 4 Med.
L. Rptr. 1502, 1503 (1978); Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 439
(1976) (Robinson, Commissioner, dissenting).
13 See $3 Billion in Stations Down the Drain?, BROADCASTING, February 3, 1969
at 19.
6 Id.
' 7 See Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular
Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424-25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Policy
Statement].
' 	 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
l" Id. at 1175.
2° See, e.g., South Florida Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2(1 971, 973 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
21 See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1971), modified, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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course is to establish no consistent policy. Instead, it has resorted to an ad hoc
approach. Such a case by case analysis has provided the FCC with the flexibil-
ity it needs to reach the result it desires, while at least nominally adhering to
the requirements of the Communications Act. 22 The courts generally have
acquiesced in this approach. 23
The courts' refusal to engage in a discussion of such an intractable policy
question may be understandable, but it has prevented them from fulfilling
their function of forcing the FCC to approach comparative renewal cases in a
consistent and comprehensible manner. There are signs, however, that the era
of complete judicial deference to the FCC in this area is at an end. In a recent
case, Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC," the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia remanded a comparative renewal case to the FCC be-
cause the court found that "the Commission's manner of 'balancing' its find-
ings was wholly unintelligible." 25 This decision is certainly a sound first step
toward the creation of a workable comparative renewal policy, but it is only a
small first step. The burden of actually developing a functional policy remains
with the FCC. Whether the Commission can produce a workable policy, and
whether the court will continue to exercise scrutiny to ensure that the FCC
does not fail in its duty, both remain open questions.
Several previous unsuccessful attempts by the FCC to develop an effec-
tiVe comparative renewal policy indicate that new efforts under Central Florida
may fail. 26
 These previous efforts, although not the products of judicial
mandate, shed considerable light on the difficulties attendant upon such an
undertaking. Not only must. the Commission wrestle with a very complex legal
issue, but it must do so under the scrutiny of the broadcast industry, a
plethora of public interest groups, the Congress, and the judiciary. Under
these circumstances it is not surprising that shortly before Central Florida was
decided the FCC recommended to Congress that the comparative renewal
process be abolished. 27
The prospects for a viable comparative renewal policy, however, are not
entirely bleak. It is the purpose of this comment to suggest that from Central
Florida, and other earlier court decisions that attempt to describe the legal
parameters within which the FCC may make its policy choices, a workable
comparative renewal policy can be fashioned. The comment begins by describ-
ing the procedural process involved in a comparative renewal hearing. It then
22 See Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 424, 439 (Robinson,
Commissioner, dissenting).
23
 See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Statement of Bazelon, C.J.).
24 598 F.2(1 37, 4 Med. L. Rpt.r. 1502 & 2009 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
25 Id. at 59, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2011.
2 ' See 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 3; 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970); NVHDH,
Inc. 16 F.C.C.2d I, (1969), modified, 17 F.C.C.2(1 856 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hearst Radio, Inc., 15
F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
27 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION TO THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON CommuNicATioNs OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE ( 1976).
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reviews the various policies the FCC has adopted over the years in its effort to
objectify the decisionmaking process, and examines the reasons for their
breakdown. Next, this comment examines the recent efforts of the court of
appeals, in Central Florida, to force the Commission to adopt a satisfactory
policy. Finally, an approach to the comparative renewal problem that meets
both the policy objectives of the FCC and the legal requirements interposed
by the courts will be proposed.
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPARATIVE HEARING
Limited space on the various broadcast bands has always made it impos-
sible for the FCC to accomodate everyone who desires and qualifies to operate
a television or radio station. Hence, some type of selection process between
mutually exclusive 28 applicants for licenses is essential. In practice, selections
are made through a comparative hearing before the FCC. These hearings
may involve comparison between original applicants, renewal applicants, or
both. Development of standards to permit rational comparison has proved
difficult for all concerned. This section describes the hearing process and in-
troduces the major problem that has arisen with regard to the effectiveness of
this process—finding a rational means of comparing new and renewal appli-
cants.
A. The Comparative Hearing Process
Under the United States Supreme Court holding in Ashbacker v. FCC,"
all applicants who file mutually exclusive petitions for broadcast licenses are
entitled to participate in a single, comparative hearing at which the applicant
thought most likely to serve the public interest will be awarded the license. 30
The Court based its holding in Ashbacker on a provision of the Communica-
tions Act that guaranteed a hearing to all applicants before they could be
denied a license. 3 ' This requirement, the Court reasoned, demanded a con-
28
 Mutually exclusive applicants are those who because of regulations or elec-
trical interference cannot each be granted licenses. Generally the term refers to appli-
cants for the same frequency in the same community. See Jones. Licensing of Major
Broadcast Facilities by the Federal Communications Commission, printed in ACTIVITIES Of
REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES RELATING TO SMALL BUSINESS: HEARINGS ON
H. RES. 13 BEFORE SUBCOMMISSION No. 6 or -rHE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL Bus-
INESS, 89th CoNc., 2ND SESS. A87. Al 12 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Jones].
20
 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
3" 326 U.S. at 333. Before Ashbacker, the FCC often awarded licenses for
which there were . competing applications without a hearing of any sort, and without
indicating that any applicant, other than the successful one, was given even the
slightest consideration. Indeed, during the four year period immediately preceding
Ashbacker, the FCC decided 36 cases involving mutually exclusive applications, and of
these, 22 were resolved without a hearing. 326 U.S. at 338 n.1 (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).
31 326 U.S. at 333. Specifically, Ashbacker held that the FCC violated section
309(a) of the Communications Act, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1085 (1934). Since
Ashbacker, Congress has amended section 309 so that hearings are now only required
when an application presents a "substantial and material question of fact." Pub, L. No.
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solidated proceeding because the grant of a license to one applicant has the
effect of a denial to all remaining applicants. 32 The Ashbacker doctrine has
survived over the past 35 years as the only way to satisfy the dual require-
ments of the Communications Act that each applicant be treated fairly and
that the public be provided with broadcasters of the highest possible quality.
Every comparative hearing poses two general questions: first, are the
applicants minimally qualified to hold broadcast licenses, and second, of those
who are qualified, which one will best serve the public interest, convenience or
necessity? Under the Communications Act, every party seeking a broadcast
license must meet certain standards of character, citizenship, financial ability,
and technical skill before the comparative question of public interest, conve-
nience or necessity will be addressed." Additionally, the FCC has broad
rulemaking and adjudicatory authority to define and add to this statutory list
of qualifications." If two or more mutually exclusive applicants pass this
preliminary muster, only then will the FCC engage in a comparative analysis.
While conceptually the minimum qualifications question must precede the di-
rect comparison of the applicants, on a practical level, because so much of the
evidence on both issues overlaps, the two questions usually are decided
through a single proceeding.''
The hearing process itself follows a detailed procedure. Whenever two or
more parties apply for the same license, they are set for a hearing which
involves the so-called "standard comparative issue"—the determination of
which applicant would better serve the public interest." The initial hearing
86-752, 74 Stat. 889 (1960) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976)). This change, how-
ever, does not diminish or alter the significance of Ashbacker, for whenever there are
two or more non-frivolous applicants for mutually exclusive licenses, a "substantial and
material question of fact" arises as to which competitor would better serve the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity." See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1973). See Central Florida
Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), clarified, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
32 326 U.S. at 333.
" See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a) R. (d), 308(h), 319(a) (1976).
34 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(1) (1976). For example, in United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), the Supreme Court upheld a Commission deci-
sion denying Storer a comparative hearing relative to the acquisition of a new fre-
quency because Storer already held the maximum number of licenses permissible
under FCC regulations. Id. at 203-04 (upholding 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.35, 3.240, 3.636
(1953)). And, more recently in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978), the Court passed favorably upon other Commission regulations
(47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1978)) limiting the formation of newspaper-
broadcast station combinations in a single community. Id. at 779. Of course, if any
qualification issue involves a serious factual dispute a hearing may be required under
section 309(e) of the Communications Act. See note 31 supra .
35
 See, e.g., WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 19 (1969) .
" See, e.g., Bartmess and Hansen, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,064 (1970). See generally
Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural Model for FCC Comparative
Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 575 (1976). Cf. FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (discussing public interest test).
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is held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 37
 who takes evidence on
whatever issues the Commission designates to be material in a particular
case." Each party is free to call witnesses, introduce evidence on its own
behalf, cross-examine opposing witnesses, and challenge evidence produced
by other parties, all in general conformity with the Administrative Procedure
Act 39
 and the Federal Rules of Evidence." Following the hearing, if the
judge finds that two or more of the applicants meet minimum qualifications,
he must undertake a complete comparative analysis. The ALJ examines, com-
pares, and makes findings with respect to the relative standing of the appli-
cants on each issue identified as material at the start of the hearing. At the
conclusion of the hearing the ALJ prepares an initial decision.'" Findings
are expressed in terms of "preferences" or "demerits" of varying degree,
which are,awarded to the contestants on each factor considered." By review-
ing the overall number and strength of the preferences and demerits earned
by each competitor, as well as by considering the importance of the categories
in which they were achieved, a winner is determined. 4" Appeals from the
determination of the ALJ may be made directly to the full Commission by
filing exceptions." Upon appeal, the Commission may decide to accept addi-
tional evidence on its own initiative, or it may accept the factual record
created by the AL] in its entirety, restricting its review to questions of law and
policy. 45
 Finally, review of Commission decisions may be had in the Court of
Appeals for the District' of Columbia, and ultimately by writ of certiorari in
the Supreme Court of the United States. 46
Traditionally, the court of appeals has exercised only limited review of
Commission decisions. Although under oft cited and seemingly broad dicta in
Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 47
 the court demands that consideration be
given to every "material difference" between applicants," as a practical matter
this restraint is minor. The FCC traditionally has exercised virtually complete
discretion in determining which substantive matters are material with respect
37
 In earlier FCC opinions an AU was referred to as a Hearing Examiner.
E.g., WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2(1 1 (1969).
" See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.221, 1.243 (1978).
3" 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1976).
" See 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1976) (incorporating APA); 47 C.F.R. § 1.351 (1978)
(relating to evidence). Additional evidentiary rules peculiar to FCC proceedings are
laid out at 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.352-1.364 (1978).
41 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.267 (1978).
' See, e.g., RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 123, 227 (1973); TV-9, Inc. v.
FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 941 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). In the
latter case, the preference-demerit continuum was confused by the court of appeals
through the introduction of the term "merit". Merit, the court explained, "is a recogni-
tion by the Commission that a particular applicant has demonstrated certain positive
qualities which may but do not necessarily result in a preference." Id.
" As to preferences generally, see Jones, supra note 28, at A 107.
" See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.365, 1.276 (1978).
45 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.276 (1978).
" See 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1976).
47 175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
48 Id. at 357.
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Id.
to the public interest. 49 While the court of appeals has the duty to set aside
arbitrary or capricious decisions by the FCC," both in theory and in practice
this limitation has been of little importance. Judicial review of FCC decisions
interpreting the public interest is inherently difficult due to the subjective
character of the public interest inquiry, and due to potential intrusion into
communications policy matters committed exclusively to the FCC. 51
As a result of the very limited review provided by the courts, the pro-
cedural regularity imposed upon the FCC as a result of Ashbacker has not
produced a consistent policy approach to comparative renewal hearings. So
long as the Commission provides a unitary hearing for all mutually exclusive
applicants, it is free to judge the applicants by virtually any standards it deems
to be appropriate. 52
 It is even possible for the Commission to employ an
"analytical methodology" in one case that is in marked conflict with the ap-
proach used in the immediately preceding case, and upon at least one occa-
sion it has done so." In the following section the reasons for such drastic
policy shifts are explored.
49 See McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
rehearing, 239 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957), where the
court stated:
It [the FCC] has .the duty, in choosing between competing applicants, to
decide which would better serve the public interest. Where that interest lies
is always a matter of judgment and must be determined on an ad hoc basis.
The broad statutory standard of "public convenience, interest, or necessity"
is not susceptible of precise or comprehensive definition. Its meaning can-
not be impressioned in a formula of general application. The responsibility
for making the determination is committed to the Commission, subject to
the limitations that it must proceed within constitutional and statutory
bounds and that it must not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
5° See id. at 18, and 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A) (1976).
'I See Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956), which states:
The selection of an awardee from among several qualified applicants is
basically a matter of judgment, often difficult and delicate, entrusted by
Congress to the administrative agency. The decisive factors in comparable
selections may well vary; sometimes one applicant is superior to another in
one respect, whereas in another case one applicant may be superior to its
rivals in another feature. And it is also true that the Commission's view of
what is best in the public interest may change from time to lime. Commis-
sions themselves change, philosophies differ, and experience often dictates
changes. Two diametrically opposite schools of thought may both be ra-
tional. All such matters are for the Congress and the executive and their
agencies. They are not for the judiciary.
Id. at 206.
.52 Id. See also FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), in
which justice Frankfurter explained that such limited review is permissible because
"[t]he Communications Act is not designed primarily as a new code for the adjustment
of conflicting private rights through adjudication. Rather it expresses a desire on the
part of Congress to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on
the dynamic aspects of radio transmission. - Id. at 138.
33
 See Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the FCG, 63 GEO.
	 705,
716 and n.63 (1975). In a striking example of the agency's sweeping discretion, within
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B. Comparative Hearings and Renewal Preferences: The Problem
Whenever parties seek mutually exclusive licenses, the comparative pro-
cess outlined above comes into play. It is essentially applicable to both renewal
proceedings—those proceedings at which the incumbent licensee seeks to
renew its license—and non-renewal proceedings—where none of the
contenders is an incumbent applicant for the frequency sought. In case of
either renewal or non-renewal proceedings, it is very difficult to make com-
parisons between the applicants. In the non-renewal context, the problem in-
volves finding fair and effective criteria for judging and comparing the un-
tried proposals and promises of each applicant. When a renewal applicant is
included in the process, the problem becomes even more difficult, for in addi-
tion to the need for reliable criteria, a method must be found to account for
the inherently unequal positions of new and renewal applicants. The obvious
distinction between these two classes of applicant is that an incumbent has a
demonstrable record of performance with the frequency in question as evi-
dence of its capabilities, while a challenger's ability to carry out its proposal
only can be estimated by resort to far less reliable factors. The establishment
of satisfactory standards by which to compare an operating broadcasting facil-
ity and an untried proposal to replace that facility has proven to be almost
impossible for the FCC. Below the problems associated with comparing in-
cumbents and challengers are discussed.
1. Renewal Preferences: The Great Unequalizers
Renewal preferences may be defined as devices employed by the FCC to
account for the different positions occupied by renewal and new applicants.
They allow the FCC to give an incumbent licensee an edge over a challenger
on the basis of a broadcast record or some other consideration applicable only
to the incumbent." The chief distinction between renewal preferences and
other means of evaluating mutually exclusive applicants is that renewal pref-
erences do not arise as a result of a comparison between applicants, but rather
are the product of an evaluation of the incumbent alone. As a simple illustra-
tion, where on the basis of a head to head comparison the challenger appears
to come out slightly ahead, the renewal applicant might still win the license
because, on the basis of past performance, the Commission has greater confi-
dence that the incumbent actually will be able to carry out its proposals.
the course of a single day it reversed in one case a long-standing policy against giving
preference for a superior programming proposal of an applicant where all of the
applicants presented meritorious plans. Then, in the very next case, it resurrected the
just-abandoned view. Compare KTRM, Inc., 19 F.C.C. 161 (1954) with Tribune Co.,
Tampa Florida, 19 F.C.C. 100 (1954), aff'd sub nom. Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
230 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956).
5 ' See, e.g., Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1175 (1951); RKO General,
Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 123, 137 (1973), afrd sub nom. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515
F.2d 684, 702 (D.C:. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975). See generally Hyde,
FCC Policy and Procedures Relating to Hearings, Etc., 1975 DUKE L.J. 153, 258-59 [here-
inafter cited as Hyde] (Mr. Hyde is past chairman of the FCC).
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There are generally three reasons given for the use of renewal prefer-
ences in comparative renewal hearings. First, the preferences are endorsed
because the incumbent's past performance naturally is the best predictor of its
ability to serve the public interest.'" Second, preferences for incumbents are
thought necessary to counterbalance the automatic advantage possessed by
new applicants who are able to make sweeping promises of public service in
their proposals without being hindered by a record of actual performance. 5 '
Third, it has been argued that renewal preferences should be awarded to
promote the public interest in stability in the broadcast industry."
The logic of the first reason is self-evident. An incumbent's previous
broadcasting performance is probably the most useful criterion available for
predicting the quality of future public service." It simply is reasonable to
assume that a superior licensee will continue to perform well. Conversely, a
poor performer is likely to remain poor. Indeed, no one seriously contends
that past performance of an incumbent should be excluded totally from con-
sideration in a comparative renewal hearing."
The second justification cited for renewal preferences centers on the ad-
vantage possessed by new applicants by virtue of their ability to "tailor" their
proposals to satisfy the FCC. Incumbent licensees do not possess this ability
because they are bound to an existing institutional structure and record of
performance. In the absence of renewal preferences, simply by exercising a
little care in designing its proposal and in selecting its opponent, a newcomer
could ensure its own success by making promises that reach beyond the estab-
lished record of the license holder. Were it not for renewal preferences to
account for the superior reliability of performance over promises, challengers
would have an overwhelming 'advantage. It is contended, therefore, that a
preferential treatment is essential to offset these advantages of the chal-
lenger."
The third argument commonly made in favor of a renewal preference
concerns the need for stability in the broadcast industry. Renewal preferences
promote stability because they effectively ensure that incumbents will retain
their licenses, provided their performance is satisfactory. Stability is needed, it
is argued, to attract the necessary capital to produce high quality program-
55 See Hyde, supra note 54, at 258.
56 See id. at 259.
57 See id. at 258-59; 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 425.
See Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1175 (1951).
59
 In 1952 Congress amended section 307(d) of the Communications Act by
deleting the provisions subjecting renewal applicants to "the same considerations" as
new applicants and substituted language which held both renewal and new applicants
to a standard of "public interest, convenience and necessity." Ch. 879, § 5, 66 Stat. 714
(1952). Presumably this change was made to avoid any inference stemming from the
original language to the effect that an incumbent licensee's broadcast record could not
be considered. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1206 n.13
(D.C. Cir. 1971). Even before the amendment, however, the FCC had clearly held that
past performance of a renewal applicant may be considered in a comparative renewal
hearing. See Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1175 (1951).
80
 See Hyde, supra note 54, at 259.
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ming. If a licensee is faced with a substantial risk that its license will be lost
within three years, it will be reluctant to invest any substantial sum of money
into the station, and creditors will be reluctant to make loans to entities in
such a precarious position."' Obviously, without capital, licensees will be un-
able to serve adequately the public interest. All three of these policies arc
undeniably reasonable, but the reasonableness of the objective does not neces-
sarily affect the legality of the particular means chosen by the FCC to carry
these- policies out.
2. The Legal Status Of Renewal Preferences
There are two distinct legal bases under which renewal preferences may
be attacked. The first argument against renewal preferences is that they deny
a challenger a genuine comparative hearing as guaranteed under Ashbacker v.
FCC." The second point in opposition to preferences is that they violate
those provisions of the Communications Act that withhold from a licensee any
right to its assigned frequency beyond the term of its license." With respect
to the Ashbacker issue, under the Communications Act as interpreted by that
case, applicants for mutually exclusive licenses are entitled to a consolidated
hearing at which their ability to serve the public interest will be fully com-
pared." 4 The FCC has recognized that renewal preferences are a threat to
this process because they are awarded solely on the basis of an incumbent's
record."5
 No comparison between applicants is involved. The FCC's interpre-
tation of Ashbacker, however, has not completely precluded it from considering
renewal preferences in making a comparison. Rather, the Commission views
Ashbacker as merely reducing the role non-comparative criteria may play in the
process. 66
In determining the legality of a renewal preference under Ashbacker, logi-
cally the weight to be given to the preference is critical. If the Ashbacker doc-
trine and renewal preferences are to coexist successfully within the framework
of the Communications Act, renewal preferences must be limited. in scope to
prevent them from overwhelming factors upon which the applicants may be
directly compared." 7 Provided the renewal preference is merely one consid-
6 ' See RKO General, 44 F.C.C.2d 123, 137 (1973).
"2 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
"" These provisions are: 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 309(h) (1976). See note 7 supra
for the text of these provisions. See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 475 (1940).
64
 326 U.S. at 333, discussed in text at notes 29-32 supra.
" See Hearst. Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1175 (1951).
6' Cf. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1211 (D.C. Cir.
(1971)) (accepting the need to reconcile renewal preferences with Ashbacker); Formula-
tion of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Etc., 66 F.C.C.2d 419,
422-23 (1977) (same) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Policy Statement].
67 If a licensee's record of performance is weighted so as effectively to permit
it to overcome all other criteria, then the award of a preference to the incumbent
based upon its performance precludes any comparison between the applicants. The
case has already been decided; the renewal applicant has won. Clearly, if a renewal
preference of such magnitude were actually utilized it would be found to be in viola-
tion of Ashbacker, but a renewal preference of somewhat lesser significance, which
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eration among many in comparing the public service potential of the appli-
cants, it should be accepted as a valid factor. 68
The second restriction on renewal preferences is based on provisions in
the Act that forbid the vesting of any right in the incumbent to the renewal of
its license. Since renewal preferences provide incumbents with an advantage
in comparative hearings it can be said that they create certain vested renewal
rights." Not all renewal preferences, however, are held to bestow illegal
rights upon incumbents; rather, the general view is that only preferences
based solely on a renewal applicant's status as incumbent create illegal rights.
Such preferences may be labeled per se preferences." Per se preferences
may be contrasted with other, earned preferences, which may be acquired by
an incumbent only on the basis of performance. 71 Per se preferences are
illegal, it is argued, because giving an inalienable advantage to a license holder
is seen as the equivalent of vesting it with a right in the frequency. 72 Con-
versely, earned preferences, because they are not automatic, are not seen as
establishing any impermissible right, provided the standards by which they are
earned reflect an inquiry into the public interest. 73 The distinction between
earned and per se preferences, while clear in theory, often becomes blurred
when a preference is awarded in an actual case. it is frequently alleged that
an earned preference often can be obtained so easily that it becomes per se in
nature. 74 Thus, a preference which in form is earned may still be attacked as
per se and, therefore, illegal.'
Both of these restrictions on the use of renewal preferences have hin-
dered the FCC substantially in the development of a consistent and predicta-
ble approach to these proceedings. The limitations distort the comparative
process because they interfere with the Commission's ability to consider fully
certain legitimate policy concerns, such as the need for stability in the broad-
cast industry, and they stand to prevent proper examination of material evi-
dence, such as an incumbent's broadcast record.
would not completely short circuit the comparative process, arguably would be permit-
ted. See Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2c1 37, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971), clarified  by 463
F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
"8
 See note 67 supra.
"" See 1977 Policy Slalemenl, supra note 66, at 420.
7() See, e.g., id. See also Hyde, supra note 54. at 259.
•	 71 See, e.g., Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d
393, 398 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Slateinen1].
" See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(statement of Bazelon, C.J.).
7 " See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 and n.35
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
" See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1208 (1).C.
Cir. 1971). See generally Hyde, supra note 54, at 259-60.
75 See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(statement of Bazelon,
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II. COMPARATIVE HEARINGS AND RENEWAL PREFERENCES: FCC POLICIES
In an effort to provide a rational comparative renewal policy, while ob-
serving statutory restrictions, the FCC has created over the years three jistinct
comparative renewal policies. These pronouncements of policy—(1) the Hearst
doctrine," (2) the 1965 Policy Statement," and (3) the 1970 Policy Statement"
—
each took substantially different approaches to the problem.
A. The Hearst Doctrine
. Hearst Radio, Inc. 79 presented the FCC with its first comparative renewal
case following Ashbacker." In Hearst, the incumbent, Hearst Radio, a sub-
sidiary of the Hearst media empire" was challenged by Public Service Radio,
a corporation created exclusively for the purpose of obtaining Hearst's license
to operate radio station WBAL, Baltimore, Maryland. 82 In making the com-
parative assessment the FCC determined that the material issues were: (1) the
financial position of each applicant; (2) their programming proposals; (3) the
participation of the respective owners in the management of the station (in-
tegration); (4) ties of the owners to the community to be served; (5) ownership
of other media outlets (diversification); (6) prior broadcasting experience of
the owners; and (7) staffing proposals. 83 All of these "criteria" had been
used before Hearst in non-renewal comparative hearings. 84 Because here a
renewal applicant was involved, however, the value to be given each criterion
had to be determined in light of Hearst's record of performance. 85 Where
relevant, the Commission explained, "[e]xcellent performance as a licensee
will be given favorable consideration where we find a reasonable likelihood
that such performance will continue. On the other hand, a record of poor
service, or of marginal service with no indications of efforts to improve such
service, will be given due weight in appraising the likelihood of effectuation of
the licensee's proposals." 8"
In applying this evaluative process to the facts of Hearst, the FCC con-
cluded that although the programming of Hearst was "unbalanced with re-
spect to an overabundance of commercial programs and commercial religious
programs, and ... lacked a desirable amount of time devoted to local activities
and sustaining programs," 87 it nevertheless met the standard of "excellent"
performance. 88 This characterization of the Hearst programming record en-
7 " See Hearst Radio Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
77 See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 71. See also Seven (7) League Produc-
tions, I F.C.C.2d 1597, 1598 (1965).
78 See 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 17.
7" 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
"" 326 U.S. 327 (1045).
8 ' See Hearst Radio Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1151-53 (1951).
82 See id. at 1168-71. (Public Service was a newly created corporation at the
tinie of die challenge).
"" hl. at 1176-83.
84 See id. at 1176.
85 Id .
8" Id. at 1175.
87 Id. at 1177.
"" Id. at 1183.
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abled the FCC to utilize the record to the benefit of the incumbent in the
consideration of five of the seven comparative criteria. Under both the criteria
of programming and staffing the FCC favored Hearst based upon the
superior reliability of its proposals as demonstrated by its record. 8" With re-
spect to the factors of integration, community involvement, and diversifica-
tion, all of which are designed primarily to guarantee a licensee's sensitivity to
community needs, the FCC neutralized Hearst's inferior showings relative to
its opponent on the grounds that these criteria deserved no weight where a
broadcast record demonstrated that the incumbent was meeting the needs of
the locality it served. `1° No advantage was given to either applicant on the
basis of the two criteria (financial position and prior broadcasting experience)
which were unaffected by Hearst's broadcast record. Thus, Hearst won pref-
erences on two criteria, Public Service won no preferences, and on the re-
maining five factors no advantage was given to either party. On this basis
Hearst was granted the license."
In Hearst, and in subsequent cases following the Hearst example, the FCC
generally took a conservative approach to comparative renewal hearings, pre-
ferring the certainty and stability of an incumbent licensee to the promise of
improved service offered by a challenger." Although the Commission was
cognizant of its obligation to provide a genuinely comparative hearing without
placing too much emphasis on non-comparative criteria, it did not permit this
legal limitation to thwart it in its duty to license the best qualified applicant
from a public service perspective. Because explicit renewal preferences were
restricted by law, the FCC resorted to more subtle forms of preference, made
possible by the case-by-case analysis of factors contained in the Hearst doc-
trine. This approach effectively denied a challenger a truly comparative pro-
ceeding, just as would a per se renewal preference. In fact, Hearst itself is a
good example of a case in which earned preferences were achieved so easily
that they were in effect hidden per se preferences. Nevertheless, in deference
to the expertise of the FCC the courts were reluctant to overturn a Commis-
sion decision that appeared to be based on a legitimate exercise of discretion,
but in fact rested on a per se renewal preference."
89 See id. at 1177-79 (with respect to programming), and at 1183 (with respect
to staffing).
9° Id. at 1179-81. For example, the diversification criteria is intended to pro-
tect against overconcentration of media outlets which might limit the public's access to
diverse opinions and sources of information. In Hearst, the incumbent held licenses to
an additional radio station and a television station in Baltimore, and owned one of the
Iwo major daily newspapers in that city while the challenger held no media interests.
Id. at 1180-81. Normally these facts would result in a preference for the challenger.
See id. at 1181. Because the record showed that no adverse impact on the Baltimore
listening public resulted from this concentration of media, however, the FCC awarded
no preference. Id.
91 Id. at 1183.
92
 See, e.g., Sunbeam Television Corp., 38 F.C.C. 805 (1965), aff'd sub nom.
Community Broadcasting Corp, v. FCC, 363 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wabash Valley
Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963).
" See text and notes at notes 74-75 supra.
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The Commission's camouflaged per se renewal preferences may be
loosely divided into two groups: (1) those achieved under the guise of the
Commission's power to select and define the criteria by which applicants are
to be judged, and (2) those that took effect through the false characterization
of evidence to be considered in a comparative hearing. The first group of
camouflaged preferences were made possible by the far-reaching discretion of
the FCC in areas of communications policy. Because the courts deferred com-
pletely to the Commission in the determination and definition of the stan-
dards by which mutually exclusive applicants were to be judged," the FCC
was able to make some facet of an incumbent's broadcast record relevant in
many of the criteria it employed." In this manner the FCC was able to
divide a renewal preference into several components, each part of which
seemed small, but which in sum was always decisive in the award of the
license. Renewal preferences of such magnitude, even if they were not illegal
as per se preferences, might be viewed under Ashhacker as endangering the
comparative nature of a hearing."" But the FCC so successfully entangled
these preferences with other policy considerations that it became impossible to
assess objectively the extent of their impact. Under such circumstances the
courts were helpless to attack FCC opinions."
The second category of disguised per se preferences involved characteri-
zations of evidence. These preferences were implemented by the misapplica-
tion of qualitative terms to describe broadcast performance. This occurred
when the FCC assessed the evidence surrounding a broadcast record and
labeled it with a descriptive term indicative of the quality of the 'record. Such
labeling was necessary because Hearst did not establish any objective standards
by which to measure broadcast performance, and instead called for subjective,
case-by-case judgments regarding an incumbent's record." Due to this lack
of a rigid evidentiary standard, it was easy for the Commission to exaggerate
the quality of a renewal applicant's record. This process of characterization
can be seen at work quite clearly in Hearst, where the FCC declared Hearst's
performance to be excellent in spite of its obvious and serious flaws."" Its
effect in Hearst was to permit the Commission to grant a preference to an
incumbent when it had not been 'earned. The award of such a preference is at
least arguably per se, and therefore illegal under the Communications Act."
B.. The 1965 Policy Statement and WHDH
As more and more cases were decided under the ad hoc approach of
Hearst, the potential for administrative abuse of discretion inherent in the doc-
94 See id.
95 See, e.g., text and notes at notes 89-90 supra.
98 See text at notes 62-67 supra.
" See, e.g., McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
"" See Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1176 (1951).
"" See text at notes 85-89 supra.
100 See text and notes at notes 69-74 supra. See generally Geller, A Modest Pro-
posal for Modest Reform of the FCC, 63 GEO. L.J. 705, 715 (1975).
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trine became increasingly manifest, and hence the focus of mounting criti-
cism."' The FCC responded to this criticism by developing an entirely new
policy. This policy, embodied in the 1965 Policy Statement, 102 and first
applied in WHDH, Inc.," 3 was directed primarily at bringing some structure,
and therefore, consistency to the comparative renewal process. To achieve this
end the FCC made three significant changes in the process: (1) it limited the
scope of the hearing to specific, predesignated criteria;'" (2) it provided
precise structured definitions of the criteria that described what the Commis-
sion was looking for in an applicant; and (3) it identified the broadcast record
as a distinct and independent criterion."
First, the Policy Statement declared that henceforth the standard criteria
by which competing applicants normally would he judged would be limited to
(1) diversification of control of the media of mass communications, (2) full
time participation in station operation by owners, and (3) broadcast. rec-
ord.'" The Commission sought to limit the number of criteria to be consi-
dered in the usual case because it concluded that the traditional approach of
permitting parties to introduce evidence on a broad range of topics rarely
added significantly to the quality of the decision, and often produced consid-
erable confusion.'" The FCC selected these three criteria because it deter-
mined that they served the dual public interest objectives of providing the
best possible service to the public, and maximizing diffusion in media control
far better than did other criteria.' 08
Second, the 1965 Policy Statement defined the three criteria in terms of
more specific sub-criteria. 1"9
 For example, with respect to the diversification
'°' See, e.g., Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677, 684 (1963)
(Bartley, Commissioner, dissenting); Jones, supra note 28, at A165-A167. See generally
Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 Geo. L.J. 655 (1959); see
also Hyde, supra note 54, at 261.
'°2
 I F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). When initially issued, this statement addressed prob-
lems with non-renewal comparative hearings, but excluded comparative renewals from
its coverage. Id. at 393 n.l. Seven League, 1 F.C.C.2d 1597 (1965), decided five months
after the Policy Statement was released, adopted the statement for use in comparative
renewal hearings. Id. at 1598. As originally drafted, the Policy Statement was to apply to
comparative renewal hearings in the first place, but several Commissioners at that time
feared that the abandonment of Hearst would endanger the stability in the broadcast
industry that the Commission had so carefully cultivated. Hyde, supra note 54 at 265-
66.
"3
 16 F.C.C.2d I, 81 (1969), rehearing, 17 F.C.C.2c1 956 (1969), aff'd sub nom,
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
104
 To avoid any obvious conflict with Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175
F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949) which demands that the FCC consider all material differ-
ences between the parties, the Commission appended to the 1965 Policy Statement a
provision permitting the addition of the other criteria in an individual case upon a
showing by an applicant that the extra factor is substantially material. 1 F.C.C.2d at
399.
"5
 See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 71.
"" Id. at 394-96, 398.
'" 7 Id. at 394.
108 Id .
109 Id. at 394-96, 398.
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criterion, the Commission stated that it was concerned with all forms of media
ownership by an applicant, print as well as broadcast, and that it would con-
sider:
(1) controlling interest in other media to be more significant than
minority ownership interests;
(2) ownership of media outlets in or near the area of proposed ser-
vice to be of greater importance than ownership of outlets in other
parts of the United States;
(3) ownership of media outlets with a large circulation or audience
to he more important than ownership of outlets that cover a limited
area;
(4) ownership of nationally or regionally important outlets to be of
greater significance than ownership of outlets that are not so impor-
tant;
(5) ownership of outlets in a non-competitive market to he of greater
significance than ownership of outlets in a competitive market.'"
The rationale of providing structured definitions, such as the ones described
above, was rooted in the belief that they would promote objective consistency
in the manner in which the Commission awarded preferences."'
Third, the 1965 Policy Statement abandoned the practice established in
Hearst of considering broadcast. records only to the extent that. they were
material in the evaluation of other criteria, and made the incumbent's broad-
cast performance an independent. criterion. "2 As under Hearst, however, the
FCC would continue to give weight only to an exceptional record; an average
performance would continue to be a neutral factor. 13 The FCC made this
change because it concluded that past performance was an independent index
of future performance." 4 With these three major adjustments in policy the
FCC hoped to objectify its analysis and eliminate charges that it unfairly fa-
vored incumbent licensees through an excessive use of renewal preferences.
The first case decided under the 1965 Policy Statement, WHDH,
Inc., "5 demonstrated the impact of this change in policy. It was the first case
11 " Id. at 394-45.
1 " Id. at 393 -94.
"2 Id. at 398.
"S
 Id. In Hearst the FCC said "excellent" perfOrmance would be given favorable
consideration. 15 F.C.C. at 1175. In the 1965 Policy, Statement the threshold for the
award of preference was described as "unusually good" performance. 1 F.C.C.2d at 398.
Whether the Commission intended to alter the standard by the use of these two de-
scriptive terms is unclear. As shall be shown in a subsequent section of this comment
such seemingly unimportant changes in wording in the renewal preference standard
were later to be given substantial significance. See text and notes at notes 173-75,
190-200 infra.
" 4 See 1 F.C.C.2d at 398.
"5 I 6 F.C.C.2d I (1969), rehearing, 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969). aff'd sub nom.
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971). Although it was in Seven (7) League Productions, 1 F.C.C.2d 1597
(1965), that the FCC formally adopted the 1965 Policy Statement fur application in
comparative renewal hearings, Seven League was terminated before the Commission or
a hearing examiner issued an opinion. See Seven (7) League Productions, Inc., 7
F.C.C.2d 513, 516 (1967).
438	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:421
in which an incumbent licensee, meeting all of the minimum requirements,
was denied the right to continue broadcasting."' WHDH involved a chal-
lenge by three parties to the television license that authorized operation on
Channel 5 in Boston, Massachusetts, held by WHDH, Inc., a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. 17 All WHDH, Inc. stock
was voted by the president of the Herald-Traveler, but the parent corporation
was not involved actively in establishing the broadcast policy of WHDH. "" In
addition to its association with the Boston Herald-Traveler, one of the Iwo
major daily newspapers then publishing in Boston, WHDH, Inc. also owned
two radio stations in the city.'' The three challengers were corporations
owned by various residents of the Boston metropolitan area, some of whom in
each corporation proposed to participate in the station management."'"
The FCC in applying the 1965 Policy Statement to the above facts, found
WHDH, Inc. deficient relative to its challengers under the comparative
criteria of diversification and integration."' Furthermore, the FCC held that.
these shortcomings could not be offset by WHDH's broadcast record which,
because it failed to show unusual sensitivity to public needs and interests,
could be characterized merely as "average" and, therefore, not deserving a
preference.'" As a result WHDH, Inc. became the first incumbent to lose a
comparative renewal hearing. 123
1 " See Comment, FCC License Renewal Policy: The Broadcast Lobby Versus the Public
Interest, 27 Sw. L.J. 325, 328 (1973).
1 " WHOM. Inc. was originally licensed under somewhat unusual cir-
cumstances. As a wholly owned subsidiary of the Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.,
WHOM, Inc. originally won the right to broadcast on Channel 5 in Boston, Mas-
sachusetts in 1957. WHDH, Inc. 22 F.C.C. 767 (1957). Upon appeal, however, the
court of appeals, while upholding the Commission based on the record before it, re-
manded the case for further proceedings regarding alleged ex parte contacts between
George McConnaughey, Chairman of the FCC, and Robert Choate, President of
WHDH. Massachusetts Bay Telecasters v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961). Upon remand the FCC again found in favor of WHDH,
but this time restricted it to a four month license term. WHDH, Inc., 33 F.C.C. 449,
454 (1962). The abbreviated term was selected because the Commission believed that
the actions of Mr. Choate compromised the character of WHDH as a licensee, and as a
result the FCC desired to review the licensee grant at an early date. Id. As a result, the
challengers asserted that WHDH, Inc. was not a regular renewal applicant, and should
be denied any favorable consideration that it normally might derive from its record of
performance. The FCC rejected this argument and deemed WHDH to be a renewal
applicant, WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d at 865.
18 See 16 F.C.C.2d 29, 35, 37 (initial decision).
19 Id. at 259.
'" The three challengers were Boston Broadcasters, Inc. (BBI), Charles River
Civic Television, Inc., and Greater Boston T.V. Co., Inc. BBI and Greater Boston
were owned exclusively by individuals from the Boston area. 16 F.C.C.2d 29, 98, 165.
All of Charles River's voting stock was held by the Charles River Civic Foundation
whose trustees were all Boston area residents. Id. at 105, 107-35. Additionally, the
Foundation held options on all outstanding non-voting stock, which at the time was
held by the various trustees as individuals. Id. at 105-07.
121 See 16 F.C.C.2d I, 12-13.
122 Id. at 10-11. See also 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 71, at 398.
'" 16 F.C.C.2d 19-20.
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Without reflecting on the correctness of the outcome, the application of
the 1965 Policy Statement in WHDH must at least be viewed as an improvement
over the Hearst doctrine with respect to its forthright use of defined and pre-
designated criteria. In particular, by isolating the broadcast record criteria
from the comparative criteria, the FCC made it possible for the court of ap-
peals to determine quickly the standard of performance required to earn a
renewal preference, and the weight being accorded to it. Thus, the court was
provided with a basis by which it could judge the Commission's compliance
with the Communications Act with respect to the award of renewal prefer-
ences. Whether or not one agreed with the result in WHDH, there is little
room for doubt as to how that result was reached.
C. The 1970 Policy Statement
The 1965 Policy Statement and its progeny, WHDH, did not long survive
as the prevailing doctrine in the field of comparative renewal hearings. The
broadcast industry, perceiving WHDH to be a serious threat to the presumably
large number of licensees that had merely average (rather than "unusually
good") broadcast records, 124 immediately mobilized, seeking judicial and
legislative reversal of the case.' 25 Apparently, as a result of this industry
pressure, the FCC just one year after WHDH, announced a new policy regard-
ing comparative renewal hearings in its 1970 Policy Statement. 126
124
 $3 Billion in Stations Down the Drain? BROADCASTING, Feb. 3, 1969, at 19.
Since WHDH limited renewal preferences to those licensees with "unusually good" rec-
ords (see text accompanying note 122 supra), average broadcasters were suddenly left
with no protection against a challenger's superior ability to tailor its application to FCC
standards (see text at notes 56, 60 supra). As a result the security of their licenses was
placed in considerable jeopardy.
125 See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841-49 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Comment, F.C.C. License Renewal Policy: The Broadcasting Lobby versus the Public
Interest, 27 Sw. L.J. 325, 329 (1973).
in 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970); Comment, F.C.C. License Renewal Policy: The Broad-
casting Lobby versus the Public Interest, 27 Sw. L.J. 325. The events following WHDH that
ultimately resulted in the 1970 Policy Statement may be summarized as follows: Upon
rehearing in WHDH, the FCC, apparently feeling the pressure generated by sharp
industry criticism, issued a second opinion that significantly curtailed the scope of the
original holding. See WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969). In what it claimed was a
clarification of its first opinion, the Commission declared that WHDH was a sui generic
case. Id. at 872-73. Essentially it distinguished WHDH from other comparative renewal
hearings on the grounds that WHDH, Inc. was only a four-month licensee and hence
more like a new applicant than a renewal applicant. (Under the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. 307(d) (1976), the normal (and maximum) license term is three years.)
Alt hough the distinction made in the rehearing is probably a reasonable one, it is
not merely a clarification, but a significant departure from the original decision.
WHDH in its initial form clearly was intended to apply to all renewal applicants facing
comparative challenges. Even in the rehearing opinion the FCC was forced to concede
that it originally had deemed WHDH, Inc. to be a renewal applicant. 17 F.C.C.2d at
865-66. There is little logic in expressly conferring this status on WHDH, Inc., and
then holding that it is to be treated as if it were not a renewal candidate. See also,
WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d I, 9-10 (1969). (In discussing the applicability of the broad-
cast record lest found in the 1965 Policy Statement, I F.C.C.2d 393, 398 (1965), to
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The 1970 Policy Statement took an approach that made the incumbent's
broadcast record the overwhelmingly dominant factor in the hearing. Under
the new procedure if the licensee could demonstrate,
that its program service during the preceding license term has been
substantially attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area,
and that the operation of the station has not otherwise been charac-
terized by serious deficiencies, he will be preferred over the new-
comer and his application for renewal will be granted.' 27
If the incumbent was found to have provided "substantial" service, therefore,
renewal would be automatic. A comparison between the incumbent and its
challengers would take place only if the Commission concluded that the
renewal applicant's broadcast record did not meet the substantial service
standard. 12" The FCC provided little guidance regarding the elements of
WHDH, Inc. it is clear that the FCC was speaking in terms of its applicability to all
renewal applicants.) The reason for this modification by the FCC would appear to be
the recognition that WHDH was destined for certain reversal through legislation,
which would significantly reduce FCC discretion in comparative renewal situations.
The Commissioners seemed to hope that the limitation of WHDH to its facts would kill
the momentum building behind such a bill. See Greater Boston Television Corp, v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In spite of the rehearing opinion, the broadcast industry continued to push for
legislative reform. Id. at 849. The focus of their attention was 8.2004, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969), a bill designed to reverse riot only WHDH, but Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), as well. S. 2004 called for a two-tier hearing process. In the
first hearing the sole issue would be the renewal of the incumbent. The second hear-
ing would involve a comparative evaluation of the challengers. Unless the FCC found
during the first hearing that the incumbent had behaved contrary to the public in-
terest, the incumbent would be renewed, and the hearing completely terminated with-
out giving consideration to any challenger's application at the second tier.
S. 2004 would have destroyed the competitive spur built. inni the Communications
Act. It would have foreclosed any direct comparison between challengers and incum-
bents, and reduced the standard for renewal to one of minimum public service. Be-
cause the approach was diametrically opposed to that of the FCC, a majority of the
Commissioners opposed S. 2004, See Cox, The Federal Communications Commission, 11
B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 595. 620 (1970). When it became apparent that the clarifica-
tion of WHDH contained in the rehearing opinion would not he enough to deter Con-
gress from pursuing legislation designed to restructure comparative renewal hearings,
the FCC of its own authority undertook to formulate a new comparative renewal pol-
icy satisfactory both to itself, and to those favoring more drastic measures. This com-
promise policy was embodied in the 1970 Policy Statement.
127
 22 F.C.C.2d at 425 (footnote omitted).
'" There was substantial similarity between the 1970 Policy Statement and S.
2004, the very legislation the Policy Statement sought to prevent. See note 126 supra.
Like S. 2004, the Polio Statement in effect called for' a two stage hearing in which the
first part was restricted to matters concerning the renewal of the incumbent, and the
second phase consisted of a comparative analysis. if necessary. The Statement, however,
differed from S. 2004 in two important respects: (1) the proceedings under the 1970
Policy Statement were technically viewed as unitary rather than as two separate hearings;
thus challengers were permitted to participate in the first phase of the hearing and
introduce evidence showing that the performance of the incumbent was inadequate;
and (2) during the first part of the hearing the incumbent, in order to avoid a com-
parison, had to show that its record was "substantial, -
 rather than just minimally ac-
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substantial service, expecting standards to evolve through the hearing proc-
ess. I" The Commission did, however, make it clear that the term encompas-
sed the average broadcaster, 10 thereby providing the protection the broad-
cast industry sought.
The 1970 Policy Statement, although substantially different from the 1965
Policy Statement, shared with the earlier document a high degree of clarity and
candor in explaining the FCC's view with respect to the scope of its legislative
mandate in the field of comparative renewal hearings. Both statements held
out the promise of making the comparative renewal process understandable
to the participants and to the courts, something the Hearst doctrine surely had
failed to do."' The 1970 Policy Statement, however, suffered from a serious
legal defect. Because it provided for the award of a conclusive renewal pref-
erence based upon the incumbent's broadcast record, it arguably denied chal-
lengers their right to a complete comparative hearing as guaranteed under
Ashbacker." 2 Apparently recognizing this danger, the FCC asserted that Ihe
1970 Policy Statement was nothing more than a reformulation of the Hearst
docirine," 3 which the courts consistently had upheld."' There is, however,
a significant distinction between Hearst and the 1970 Policy Statement. Linder
Hearst the Commission never conceded that a renewal preference ever could
he absolutely conclusive of the comparative issue. No matter what the cir-
cumstances, all of the criteria were to be examined.t"t' Conversely, the award
of a renewal preference under the 1970 Policy Statement explicitly pre-empted
ceptable. Although the 1970 Policy Statement, like S. 2004, provided a renewal prefer-
ence of sufficient magnitude to override all other considerations, the FCC saw the
Statement as an improvement over S. 2004, primarily because it demanded a higher
level of performance from broadcasters before they could be guaranteed renewal.
Compare 1970 Policy Statement, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970) with S. 2004, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1969) (which sought to amend 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) by adding:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, the Commission, in acting
upon any application for renewal of a broadcast license filed under section
308, may not consider the application of any other person for facilities for
which renewal is sought. If the Commission finds upon the record and
representations of the licensee that the public interest, convenience, and
necessity has been and would be served thereby. it shall grant the renewal
application. If the Commission determines after a hearing that a grant of
the application of a renewal applicant would not be in the public interest,
convenience, and necessity, it shall deny such application. and applications
for construction permits by other parties may then be accepted, pursuant
to section 308, for the broadcast station previously licensed to the renewal
applicant whose renewal was denied.
S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. (1069).
' 2" 22 F.C.C.2d at 426,
1 " Id. at 426-27.
" 1 Sec text at notes 92-100 supra.
"2 See text and notes at notes 64-68 supra.
" 3 22 F.C.C.2d al 425.
134 See, e.g., South Florida Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cell. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Community Broadcasting Corp., 363 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
"5 See, e.g.. Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963).
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the consideration of other criteria. This difference between the two proce-
dures was central to a subsequent challenge to the 1970 Policy Statement in the
Court of Appeals for the District. of Columbia.'"
As noted earlier, the court of appeals traditionally had exercised very
limited review of comparative renewal cases.'" As a result of this policy, the
FCC in its implementation of the Hearst doctrine had been able to secrete
renewal preferences of perhaps excessive magnitude in its opinions without
risking a rebuke from the court. 118
 When the FCC unmasked these renewal
preferences and made them the centerpiece of the 1970 Policy Statement, it.
became impossible for the court to ignore them any longer. Almost im-
mediately after it was issued, the 1970 Policy Statement was challenged in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In that challenge, Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC,"" the court was confronted with the issue of
whether the FCC could grant a challenged incumbent renewal without going
through the formalities of a full comparison. The case was brought by two
public interest groups' and two applicants for television licenses. 141 These
petitioners sought to have the 1970 Policy Statement set aside as violative of the
full hearing requirements described in Ashbacker and section 309(e) of the
Communications Act. 142
 They alleged that the Commission, in granting au-
tomatic renewal to any licensee that had a "substantial" broadcast record,
foreclosed to challengers their statutory right to a hearing on whether they
might be able to provide service more substantial than that provided by the
incumbent. 143
The court of appeals found this argument to be persuasive, and there-
fore, struck down the Policy Statement.'" While holding that Ashbacker pre-
vented the use of conclusive renewal preferences, the court, in extensive dicta,
described in greater detail than it ever had previously, its view of the le-
gitimate parameters of a comparative renewal hearing. 145
 The court ac-
"" See Citizens Communications Center, 447 F.2d 1201, 1203-05 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
137
 See text and notes at notes 47-51 supra.
1 " See Fidelity Television Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(statement of Bazelon).
139
 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), clarified by 463 F.2d 822 (1972).
140 The two groups were Citizens Communications Center (CCC) and Black
Efforts for Soul in Television (BEST), two non-profit organizations created to improve
the responsiveness of broadcast media to community needs and promote media owner-
ship by minorities. Id. at 1202 n.2.
141 The two license applicants were Hampton Roads Television Corp., challeng-
ing a renewal applicant in Norfolk, Virginia, and Community Broadcasting of Boston,
Inc., seeking to displace a television licensee in Boston, Massachusetts. Id.
142 These petitions were filed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970) and 28
U.S.C. § 2342 (1970), which permit any party aggrievedby a final order of the FCC to
seek to have that order enjoined, set aside, amended, or suspended by the court of
appeals. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970).
143
 447 F.2d at 1203-05.
144
 Id. at 1214.
145
 The court stressed the requirement of Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
175 F.2d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1949), that the FCC must baseits decision on a comparison
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krliwledged the propriety of utilizing earned and non-conclusive renewal pref-
erences under limited circumstances. It endorsed the proposition that in-
cumbent licensees should be judged primarily on their record of perform-
ance, and with this in mind declared that "superior" performance should he a
"plus of major significance in renewal proceedings."'"
On the surface Citizens appeared to mandate a return to the 1965 Policy
Statement. First, if "superior" performance (Citizens) is equated with "unusually
good" performance (1965 Policy Statement)) 47
 the threshold for the award of
a renewal preference is the same in both cases. In addition, the procedure for
making comparisons between incumbent. and challenging applicants on
criteria other than broadcast record was identical. Neither the 1970 Policy
Statement nor Citizens abandoned the 1965 Policy Statement criteria. The 1970
Policy Statement merely restricted the inquiry to cases where the incumbent.
could not show that its service had been substantial, and Citizens required only
that this distinguishing restriction be eliminated. 148
 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, Citizens' prohibition on conclusive renewal preferences meant that
broadcast record could be considered at most a factor of "substantial impor-
tance," as it had been under the 1965 Policy Statement) ." Thus, Citizens ap-
peared to leave the FCC little procedural latitude beyond the 1965 Policy
Statement . 150
of the applicants based on all relevant factors. Id. at 356-57. See also text at notes 29-32
supra. Moreover, the court criticized the now abandoned approach of Hearst, 15 F.C.C.
1149 (1951), and Wabash Valley, 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963), because of the insurmountable
advantage it gave to incumbents on the basis of their status. 447 F.2d at 1208.
146 447 F.2d at 1213.
' 47
 1 F.C.C.2d at 398.
149 See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1210 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
149 1 F.C.C.2d at 398.
15 " The interpretation of Citizens that saw a return to the 1965 Policy Statement
was accepted by the Commission, by commentators and, for a time, even by the Court
of appeals itself. See, e.g., Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 4 Med. L. Rptr.
1502, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1978), modified, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 2009 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (full text
of modified opinion appears at 598 F.2d 37); Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d
684, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975); RKO General Inc., 44
F.C.C.2d 123, 130 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 84
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975). See generally Comment, F.C.C. License
Renewal Policy: The Broadcasting Lobby versus the Public. Interest, 27 Sw. L.J. 325, 335
(1973). This analysis, however, does not fully capture some of the more subtle ramifi-
cations of the case. Specifically, the court in declaring that "incumbent licensees should
be judged primarily on their records of past performance," Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971), strongly suggested that the
comparative criteria, such as diversification and integration, be given minimal weight
in evaluating an incumbent. Because the 1965 Policy Statement relies heavily on criteria
other than broadcast record to assess renewal applicants, it seems unlikely the Citizens
court intended to require a return to the 1965 Policy Statement approach to compara-
tive renewal hearings. See Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural
Model for F.C.C. Comparative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 573,
591 (1976).
Interpreting Citizens as mandating adherence to the 1965 Policy Statement also ig-
nored what Citizens did not say with respect to renewal preferences. Although the
944	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:421
III. CENTRAL FLORIDA ENTERPRISES V. FCC:
HOPE FOR A RATIONAL POLICY
Following Citizens, the FCC returned to the procedure of the 1965 Policy
Statement. In substance, however, Commission policy more closely resembled
Hearst. 151  While its opinions were steeped in the language of the 1965 Policy
Statement, the FCC revived the techniques it had pioneered in Hearst to award
additional renewal preferences to incumbents.'" The court of appeals, at
court did declare that "superior" performance should be a plus of major significance,"
447 F.2d at 1213, it did not explicitly preclude the possibility that lesser performance
might earn a plus of lesser significance. If additional preferences were to be permissi-
ble, Citizens differs from the 1965 Policy Statement, It was widely assumed that the
court, through its silence, was restricting the award of renewal preferences to superior
performers, but such an assumption is not supported by any positive language in the
opinion. It is true that a plus of major significance for superior performance and a
demerit precluding renewal for insubstantial perfi.wmance were the only means men-
tioned in Citizens by which a performance record could be factored into a comparative
renewal decision. Id. But if they were the only means available, for what is presumably
the vast majority of stations (those providing service somewhere in between these two
extremes), broadcast record would be a neutral factor. It is difficult to square this
interpretation of Citizens with that portion of the opinion which favors the use of
broadcast records as the primary tool in evaluating licensees. Broadcast record evalua-
tion cannot be both a major.
 .component of the process and available only to a handful
of stations.
Further support for the proposition that Citizens did not endorse the use of the
1965 Policy Statement in a renewal context may be found in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F,2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1970), affg
WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), rehearing, 17 F.C.C.2cl 856 (1969). Although the
applicability of the 1965 Policy Statement to comparative renewal hearings was not in
controversy in Greater Boston, the court in dicta noted that if the issue had come before
it there would have been a question "whether the Commission had unlawfully inter-
fered with legitimate renewal expectancies implicit in the structure of the Coin-
munications1 Act. - Id. at 854. In view of this expressed concern, coming as it did just.
six months prior to Citizens, it seems unlikely that the court intended to adopt the 1965
Policy Statement for use in renewal cases. Citizens at no time discussed the question the
court had raised in Greater Boston regarding the 1965 Policy Statement, nor did it suggest
in any way that the court had concluded that its doubts were unfounded.
For the reasons discussed above, Citizens need not, indeed should not, he inter-
preted as mandating a return to the 1965 Policy Statement approach to comparative
renewal hearings which required unusually good past performance before any renewal
preference could be awarded. Undeniably, however, if Citizens is read uncritically such
an erroneous interpretation easily may be made. In filet in two subsequent cases panels
of the Court. of Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted Citizens to apply the
1965 Policy Statement. See Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 4 Med. L. Rpt r. 1502
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Fidelity Television, Inc„ 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 926 (1975). In the former case, however, the court, upon rehearing, was
apparently persuaded that its reading of Citizens was in error for it then endorsed a
more flexible rule regarding renewal preferences. See Central Florida Enterprises v.
FCC, 4 Nled. L. Rptr. 2009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
See, e.g., Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C,C.2d 372 (1976). rehearing, 62
F.C.C.2d 953 (1977), mid sub nom. Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37
(D.C. Cir. 1978); RKO General, 44 F.C.C.2d 123 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Fidelity Televi-
sion, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cent. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975).
See text at notes 92-97 supra, with respect to their techniques.
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first, appeared to assume a posture of deference to Commission judgments.
In reviewing FCC decisions the court did not examine critically the manner in
which criteria were applied to ensure that challengers were not being prej-
udiced unfairly by hidden renewal preferences. k 53 Recently, however, in
Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, the court of appeals has indicated that it now
is prepared to take a more active role in reviewing FCC actions. 154 Both the
FCC opinion that provoked this response from the court, as well as the court's
opinion, are described and analyzed in this section with a view toward the
potential impact of this case on future proceedings.
A. The FCC Opinion: Cowles Florida Broadcasting
In Cowles Florida Broadcasting 155 a single challenger sought to displace a
television licensee in Daytona Beach, Florida. The incumbent, Cowles Florida
Broadcasting, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Cowles Communications, Inc.
(CCI), the holder of several other broadcast and print media interests. 15" CCI
did not involve itself in the day to day management of the station, preferring
to delegate this responsibility to local management personnel. 157 Over its most
recent three year license term Cowles had compiled a generally favorable, but
not exceptional, broadcast record. 1513 The challenger, Central Florida Enter-
prises, was incorporated specifically for the purpose of mounting this chal-
lenge against Cowles.'" Its shareholders, who were predominantly from the
Daytona Beach area, asserted that they were motivated by "certain in-
adequacies" in Cowles's management of the station.'" Central Florida pro-
posed to involve sonic of its shareholders in the management positions. This
direct participation in station affairs was necessarily limited, however, clue to
the lack of broadcasting experience amongst the owners.'"' In designating
the case for hearing the FCC, at Central Florida's urging, directed that two
additional factors, beyond the standard criteria of the 1965 Policy Statement, be
explored: (1) whether Cowles had violated Commission rules by moving its
main studio from Daytona Beach, the city of assignment, to Orlando,' 1' 2 and
(2) whether the mail fraud allegedly engaged in by five wholly owned sub-
sidiaries of CCI reflected adversely upon the character qualifications of
Cowles as a licensee."33
See, e.g., Fidelity Television. Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (1).C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied. 423 U.S. 926 (1975).
154
	 Central Florida Enterprises V. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 49-51, 4 Med. I... Rptr.
1502, 1509-11 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
155 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), rehearing, 62 F.C.C.2d 953 (1977), reu'd mil) nom,
Central Florida Enterprises, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
15" 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 393.
157 Id. at 411.
"8 62 F.C.C.2d at 955-56.
15"
 See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 260, 260-64 (1970).
I"" Id. at 261.
'' 60 F.C.C.2d at 411-12.
"2 Id. at 373. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.613 (1978).
"3 60 F.C.C.2d at 373. The FCC also designated certain engineering questions
as special issues, but they are not relevant for the purposes of this discussion. See id.
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In deciding the case in favor of Cowles the FCC determined that neither
the factors suggested by Central Florida, nor the standard criteria, required a
finding against. Cowles. Regarding the studio move, although the FCC found
that Cowles had shifted its main studio site out of the city of assignment in
violation of FCC rules, the Commission declined to award a demerit to Cowles
on the grounds that, (1) "there was little evidence the ... move involved a
deliberate corporate decision to defy the Commission's rules,"'“ and (2)
Cowles maintained auxiliary facilities in Daytona Beach, hence, there had not
been a downgrading of service to that area.'" On the mail fraud question,
although the FCC found that fraudulent practices pervaded CC['s five
magazine subscription sales subsidiaries, and that it was inconceivable that
CCI could have been unaware of the corruption,' 66
 the Commission declined
to hold the sins of CCI and its other subsidiaries against Cowles. 1 ' Thus,
the FCC concluded that the supplemental issues provided no basis for favor-
ing Central Florida.
With respect to the standard criteria described in the 1965 Policy State-
ment, the Commission minimized Central Florida's advantages. On the diver-
sification of control criterion the FCC fOund Central Florida to hold a clear
advantage over Cowles because, unlike Cowles, Central Florida had no other
media interests.'" But, the Commission held that this preference was of lit-
tle decisional significance because, (I) all Cowles's additional media interests
lay outside the Daytona Beach area, and (2) Cowles, by permitting a local and
autonomous management team to operate the station, insulated the station
"4
 Id. at 390, 399.
166
 Id. at 390.
166 Id. at 391-92, 403. Ultimately CCI negotiated a plea bargain with the Justice
Department whereby the five subsidiaries would agree to plead nolo contendere to fifty
counts of mail fraud (ten each) and accept a collective fine of $50,000. Id. at 391-92.
I" Id. at 405-06. The Commission did note, however, that under more ex-
treme circumstances the non-broadcast related activities of a parent corporation could
have an adverse impact upon an applicant's character qualifications. Id. at 406. See
generally Report on Uniform Policy as to Violations of the Laws of the United States, 42
F.C.C.2d 399 (1951). Nevertheless, the Commission has been lax in enforcing this pol-
icy. See General Electric Co., 45 F.C.C. 1592 (1964);. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.,
44 F.C.C. 2778 (1962) (non-broadcast subsidiaries of G.E. and Westinghouse were con-
victed of bid-rigging and price-fixing valued at $1.75 billion annually. It was charac-
terized by then Attorney General William P. Rogers as involving "as serious instances
of bid-rigging and price-fixing as have been charged in the more than half century life
of the Sherman Act." 44 F.C.C. at 2779. Yet the FCC deemed this behavior to be not
sufficiently serious to deny license renewal), More recently, the FCC did refuse to
renew three television licenses held by RKO General, Inc. at least in part because of
the misconduct of its parent corporation, General Tire & Rubber Co. In this case,
however, there was also substantial evidence that RKO itself also engaged in certain
improper business practices. Specifically, RKO was alleged to have been involved in a
scheme to pressure companies into placing advertising with RKO stations as a condi-
tion of doing business with General Tire. Additionally, there was evidence that RKO
had given the FCC misleading information in an effort to cover-up certain of' these
activities. See RKO General, Inc., _F.C.C.2d_ (1980); FCC Finds RKO is Unqua4/ied
as TV Licensee, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 25, 1980 at 6 col. I (quoting the Commis-
sion).
168 60 F.C.C.2d at 407.
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from its other holdings, thereby achieving the functional equivalent of diver-
sification.'" Similarly, under the integration criterion, which measures the
owners participation in day to day station management, the FCC, while admit-
ting that Central Florida was "somewhat stronger" than Cowles,"° again
offset this advantage on the grounds that the local and independent manage-
ment of the incumbent produced the functional equivalent of integration."'
As for broadcast record, the FCC declared Cowles's performance to be
"superior" within the meaning of Citizens, and therefore, a major renewal
preference was awarded. 172
 This renewal preference was deemed to out-
weigh Central Florida's advantages on the other criteria. Thus, Cowles was
awarded a new license.
Significantly, six months after its decision to renew Cowles over the chal-
lenging application of Central Florida, the FCC, of its own motion, reconsid-
ered its characterization of Cowles's broadcast record, and backed down a bit
from its previously laudatory appraisal of Cowles. The Commission in this
second opinion claimed that it had used the term "superior" in describing
Cowles's performance to indicate that the service provided was "sound, favor-
able and substantially above a level of mediocre service which might. just min-
imally warrant renewal."'" The Commission explicitly declared that it did
not mean to convey the impression that it believed Cowles's record to be ex-
ceptional.' 74
 To clarify matters, the FCC recharacterized Cowles's record as
"substantial". But the Commission left undisturbed the "plus of major signifi-
cance" it had received for its record. 175
 The clarification, therefore, did not
affect the outcome of the hearing.
The Cowles opinion was nothing short. of incredible. The Commission
found Cowles to be in violation of FCC rules with respect to its studio move,
and found CCI, Cowles's parent corporation, to be involved in a massive mail
fraud scheme. But the Commission elected to ignore completely these fac-
tors.'" The FCC then undercut the 1965 Policy Statement, to which it claimed
to be adhering, by converting its structural criteria to functional equiva-
lents. 177
 In so doing, the Commission wiped out the advantages the chal-
lenger, Central Florida, held on these criteria, and, in effect, provided Cowles
with disguised renewal preferences, similar to those provided under the Hearst
doctrine.' 78
The procedure of the FCC in Cowles amounted to the award of disguised
renewal preferences because in deciding that Cowles had provided the func-
1 " See id.; 62 F.C.C.2d at 956-57.
10 60 F.C.C.2d at 411.
"' Id. at 415. See also Comment, Comparative License Renewal Hearings and the
Protection of The Public Interest, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1801, 1807-08 (1979).
172 Id. at 421.
173
 62 F.C.C.2d at 955.
174 Id. at 955-56.
1 " Id.
17"
 See text at notes 162-67 supra.
177
 See text at notes 168-71 supra.
178 See text at notes 93-97 supra with respect to Hearst.
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tional equivalent of both diversification and integration in its broadcast opera-
tion, the FCC gave Cowles credit for something only a licensee could achieve.
While there may be considerable logic in acknowledging the steps a renewal
applicant has taken to avoid the effects of overconcentration of media in-
terests and of absentee ownership, these efforts should he evaluated as part of
the incumbent's performance record, not as mitigating factors under the in-
tegration and diversification criteria. Because these elements of a licensee's
record are renewal preferences, they properly should be considered with
other renewal preferences in a single criterion. In this way, upon review the
courts may ascertain more readily the overall weight being accorded these
preferences, and hence, whether the opinion conforms to the requirements of
A,s-hbacker. 179
The manner in which the FCC characterized Cowles's broadcast record
distorted the intent of the 1965 Policy Statement to an even greater extent than
its above described treatment of the diversification and integration criteria. It.
was the Commission's position that. Cowles's "substantial" performance was
sufficient to override the advantages of Central Florida on every other factor
considered. This policy is virtually indistinguishable from the one articulated
in the 1970 Policy Statement, which was struck down emphatically by the court
in Citizens.'" The Commission even went so far as to use the same descrip-
tive term in Cowles ("substantial") that it had employed in the 1970 Policy
Statement, seemingly daring the court of appeals to overturn the judgment.
B. The Court Reaction: Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC
In Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC"' the court of appeals accepted the
Commission's apparent dare, and vacated and remanded Cowles. The court
was critical of the FCC for the way it discounted the supplemental issues of
mail fraud and studio location, and fir the manner in which it belittled Cen-
tral Florida's advantages under the integration and diversification criteria.'"
The court also found the Commission's discussion of Cowles's broadcast rec-
ord to he unintelligible.'"
'' See text at notes 204-09 infra.
"" See text at notes 142-44 supra. The only distinction between the 1970 Policy
Statement and Cordes was that under Cow/es it was at least theoretically possible for
Central Florida to have overcome Cowles's renewal preference whereas under the
1970 Policy Statement the renewal preference would have been absolutely conclusive.
This is an especially thin distinction, however, considering the sizable advantage Cen-
tral Florida appeared to have until the FCC so adeptly minimized it.
1BI 598 F.2(.1 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1502 (1).C. Cir. 1978) and 4
Med. L. Rptr. 2009 (D.C. Cir. 1979). (In citing to Central Florida it will not be possible
to give parallel cites in every instance because the Federal Reporter clues not contain
all of the language appearing in the Media Law Reporter. This disparity is the result
of a modification in the opinion. The Federal Reporter contains only the modified
version of the opinion, while the Media Law Reporter contains the original opinion
and the modification order.)
182 See id. at 49-50, 4 Med. I.,. Rim. at 1509-10.
188 Id. at 60-61, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2012-13.
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Regarding the studio move and mail fraud issues, the court found un-
tenable the rationale of the Commission in deciding to ignore Cowles's
shortcomings. The court held the studio move deserved greater consideration
because it involved a clear violation of FCC rules. The court considered it
unwise for the FCC to ignore a violation of its own rules, even where the
breach was harmless, because such an approach might foster future disregard
for the rules where licensees conclude that their conduct is not contrary to
FCC policy. 184 As for the mail fraud problem, the court held that it was
unreasonable for the FCC to dismiss the matter on the grounds that Cowles
was not involved in the alleged crimes because Cowles and the offending CCI
subsidiaries possessed several common officers.'"
In considering the integration and diversification criteria, the court
found the Commission's use of a functional analysis to be tantamount to the
elimination of these factors.'" A functional approach meant that the chal-
lenger not only had to show that it held an advantage under the structural
definitions of these criteria, but also that the deficiency of the incumbent pro-
duced an adverse effect on the licensee's performance." 7 The court con-
sidered this additional requirement to be an impossible burden for most
challengers to bear.'" Elimination of these criteria, without implementing
alternative criteria, the court reasoned, destroyed all bases for comparison be-
tween challengers and incumbents. The Commission's approach, therefore,
effectively denied challengers their right to a comparative hearing.'"
Turning to the Commission's handling of Cowles's broadcast record, the
court. at first simply rejected the Commission's award of a renewal preference
to Cowles for a "sound" performance as inconsistent with Citizens which re-
stricted renewal preferences to those licensees with "superior" records. 190 In
the course of denying an FCC petition for rehearing en bane, however, the
original Central Florida panel modified its opinion." The new opinion,
rather than finding any specific legal impediment in the FCC's approach,
simply held that the Commission's treatment of Cowles's broadcast record was
so cryptic as to be "completely opaque to judicial review." "'z
The revision of the Central Florida opinion was brought about by the
court's decision to expand the availability of renewal preferences. Instead of
limiting preferences to broadcasters with "superior" records, the court ex-
pressed a willingness to accept preferences awarded for "meritorious serv-
ice." 193 Although the court did not define meritorious service, it did make it
clear that it is a lower standard than superior service.'" The court was not
" 4 Id. at 51-52, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 1511.
"5 Id. at 52, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 1511-12.
"" Id. at 56, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 1515.
1"7 Id. at 54, 56, 4 Med. L. Rpt.r. at 1513, 1515.
' 88 Id.
189 Id .
"" 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 1505.
''l 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2009-10.
" 2 598 F.2d at 61, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2013.
"" Id. at 43-44, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2009-10.
114 See id.
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sure, however, from the FCC's opinions whether what the Commission de-
scribed as the "substantial" performance of Cowles was sufficient to earn a
preference under the "meritorious service" test.'" Thus, the court con-
cluded that there was no basis for reconsideration of its previous order.'""
Central Florida represents a significant departure from prior court policy
regarding FCC comparative renewal decisions."' First, the court appears to
be announcing that it no longer will defer to the Commission's judgment.
when it suspects that the FCC is abusing its broad discretion by providing an
unwarranted preference to an incumbent.'" Second, in modifying its opin-
ion, the court abandoned the interpretation of Citizens that restricts the award
of renewal preferences to broadcasters with superior records. 199 Thus, at the
same time the court was attempting to end the FCC practice of hiding re-
newal preferences amongst supposedly comparative criteria through stricter
scrutiny of FCC opinions, and it was offering an alternate method of account-
ing for the valid concerns embodied in those hidden preferences by easing
the terms under which a licensee can earn a legitimate renewal preference. Z 11
105 Id. at 60-61, 4 Med. L. Rpm at 2012-13.
196 Id .
197 Compare 598 F.2d at 43-44, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2009-10 with Citizens Com-
munications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971) for the purpose of
contrasting the "meritorious" and "superior" standards.
"' s
 598 F.2d at 41, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 1504. "illt is the judicial function to
insure that such discretionary choices as ate entailed in these proceedings are rigor-
ously governed by traditional principles of fairness and administrative regularity." Id.
199 See id. at 43-44, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2009-10. See also note 150 supra, as to
whether the "superior" standard was the exclusive test justifying some form of renewal
preference under Citizens.
20" This renewal preference pressure valve was not present in the original ver-
sion of Central Florida. See 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In fact, the primary
effect of the modification was to lower the threshold at which renewal preferences
could be earned. Ostensibly, this change was made to reflect the Supreme Court's
opinion in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978),
which the court of appeals apparently at first overlooked. (National Citizens was decided
three months before the court of appeals issued its first opinion in Central Florida.)
National Citizens concerned the legality of a Commission order directing certain daily
newspaper-broadcast facility combinations located in a single city to divest themselves
of one of their media interests. Id. at 779. In the course of upholding this order the
Court briefly discussed renewal preferences, stating that "a licensee who has given
meritorious service has a legitimate renewal expectanc[y]." Id. at 805. Thus the rewrite
of Central Florida appears to have been designed to account for this language. The first
version of Central Florida, however, was not necessarily at odds with National Citizens,
for the Supreme Court, in discussing the award of renewal preferences for "meritori-
ous" service, relied upon the "superior performance" language in Citizens Communica-
tions Center for authority. See id. Therefore, the court of appeals easily could have
dismissed the use of the phrase "meritorious Service" in National Citizens as loosely
phrased dicta intended to be synonymous to "superior performance." Indeed, this is
not only a plausible interpretation, but probably the correct one as well. The court of
appeals, however, apparently decided to make use of the superior/meritorious distinc-
tion to provide a safety valve, which upon reflection, the court determined was neces-
sary.
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To aid the court in its oversight role, Central Florida also reaffirms the
FCC's obligation to provide the court with sound reasoning for its conclu-
sions.'" Where the court once would accept uncritically FCC holdings in
deference to the agency's supposed expertise, it now demands that the Com-
mission explain, with some precision, the bases for its decisions. 202 To make
it easier to review the Commission's compliance with Ashbacker, the court re-
quires "that the Commission describe with at least rough clarity how it takes
into account past performance, and how that factor is balanced alongside its
findings under the comparative criteria." 2 " 3 By isolating all of the various
renewal preferences from the comparative criteria and by demanding clear
justifications for their existence and magnitude, the court should be able to
see more clearly the impact renewal preferences are having on the process,
and be able to make judgments more confidently as to whether they are
breaking down.the comparative process.
IV. ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR THE FCC
AND THE COURT AFTER CENTRAL. FLORIDA
The difficulty the court faces as it attempts to keep the FCC within the
law without interfering with the discretionary licensing authority reserved to
the Commission is compounded by the current comparative renewal proce-
dure which often obscures rather than clarifies the capabilities of the appli-
cams. New applicants, usually organized for the sole purpose of making a
license challenge, 204 invariably are able to out-perform their incumbent oppo-
nents on criteria such as integration and diversification. 205 Thus, a licensee,
if it is to prevail, must depend upon its broadcast record. Where an incum-
bent wins on the strength of its record while losing on every other factor the
spectre of FCC bias is raised. While often this reaction may be justified, it also
may be the product of a superficial score card approach to the analysis. It is
natural to expect that the applicant that wins the most preferences would win
the license. When such an applicant loses on the basis of a single preference
awarded to its incumbent opponent, a sense that it has been treated unfairly is
understandable. When the offsetting preference received by the incumbent is
for broadcast performance, a factor exclusively applicable to the incumbent,
the sense of injustice is understandably magnified. What often is lost sight of,
however, is the superior value of past performance as a predictor of future
201 Compare Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 27, 49, 4 Med. L.
Rptr. 1502, 1510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1978) with Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d
351, 356-57 {D.C. Cir. 1949).
202 See Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 49, 4 Med. L. Rptr.
1502, 1510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
203 Id. at 61, 4 Med. L. Rptr. at 2013.
104 See, e.g., Central Florida Enterprises, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 260, 260-64 (1970);
Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1168-71 (1951); RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d
149, 188-89 (1969) (initial decision).
2" See, e.g., Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 407, 411
(1976); WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 19 (1969); RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 149,
225-26 (1969) (initial decision).
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performance relative to the value of criteria such as integration and diversifi-
cation. Consideration of a broadcast record's predictive value in the context of
a comparative renewal hearing is essential. The present procedure, funda-
mentally one of point by point comparison, however, makes proper considera- •
tion of noncomparative criteria, such as broadcast record, difficult. Noncom-
parative factors appear to destroy the balance of the procedure. As a result,
analysis of comparative renewal proceedings often focuses on whether an in-
cumbent's record can justifiably offset its inferior showing on other criteria,
rather than on which applicant. shows a greater potential for public service.
There is one small, simple, and obvious adjustment in the present. prac-
tice which could do much to solve this problem. The use of the comparative
criteria to evaluate incumbents should be ended. As all alternative, incum-
bents should be judged solely on their performance as licensees, while only
challengers would be assessed through the application of the so-called com-
parative criteria. Then, on the basis of the independent evaluation of each
applicant, a judgment would be made as to which one will best. serve the
public interest, convenience and necessity. This approach to comparative re-
newal proceedings would provide a full and fair hearing for all applicants so
long as an incumbent's performance as a licensee could not produce an in-
surmountable advantage. The 1970 Policy Statement, which also proposed to
judge incumbents solely on the basis of broadcast record, was struck down by
the court of appeals in Citizens because it created conclusive preferences, not.
because it eliminated direct comparisons. 2 " In fact, shortly after Citizens, in A.H.
Belo Corp., 297
 the FCC, drawing upon language in Citizens which stated that
"incumbent licensees should be judged primarily on their records of past per-
formance," 2 " announced a policy whereby renewal applicants were to he
evaluated by their records, while new applicants were to be judged on the
basis of integration and of local residence of owners. 209
 This policy is
substantially identical to the one proposed here. Before Belo was decided,
however, the FCC abandoned its newly created policy. 21 ". Under the then
prevalent interpretation of Citizens, which restricted the award of renewal pref-
erences to licensees with superior records, the Belo policy was unworkable
because, for all of those broadcasters with less than superior broadcast. his-
tories, there was no basis f'or evaluation. The modified version of Central
Florida, however, by permitting the award of renewal preferences to meritori-•
ous performers, effectively removes this obstacle to the Belo approach.
A return to a Belo type policy would eliminate t.wo significant shortcom-
ings of the present comparative renewal process.- First, the identification of
renewal preferences would be far easier because every consideration favoring
the incumbent would be by definition a renewal preference. Keeping renewal
2 "" See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1 9 01, 1212-13
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
217 40 F.C.C.2d 1131 (1973).
2 " Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 MC. Cir.
197 O.
200 A.H. Belo Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 1131, 1133 (1973).
211 Belo Broadcasting Corp., 47 F.C.C.2d 540, 543-44 (1974).
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preferences distinct from other preferences is essential if the courts are to be
able to review FCC decisions for potentially illegal renewal preferences, which
give incumbents unfair advantages. Second, such a policy would insulate the
incumbent from the hazards of evaluation under the comparative criteria,
which tend to exaggerate a licensee's deficiencies. Since actual performance is
a far better predictor of public service potential than the comparative criteria,
where broadcast history is available the comparative criteria should be given
little weight. Where an applicant has no record, however, necessity dictates
that comparative criteria be relied upon exclusively.
The inescapable fact is that the comparative criteria possess tremendously
different predictive significance depending on whether they are being applied
to a renewal or original applicant. This fact is obscured too easily when the
applicants, at least in part, are compared directly on the basis of these criteria.
Because the criteria provide a simple basis for point by point comparison,
there is a tendency to view them as an equitable means of evaluation, but the
fairness of applying these criteria to new and renewal applicants alike is illu-
sory. In fact, the criteria strongly favor new applicants because they have the
flexibility to conform to them. Thus, any comparison on the basis of these
criteria results in a distorted picture of the applicant's relative merits as licens-
ees. To avoid such distortion, the attempt to make such comparisons should
be abandoned.
Of course if renewal applicants are evaluated by their record of
performance, and new applicants are judged by some other criteria designed
to predict their future performance, they no longer will be in head to head
competition on particular criteria. This might seem to he a considerable sac-
rifice, but the notion that direct comparisons provide any kind of basis on
which to assess applicants is erroneous. Surely the history of the comparative
renewal process provides ample support for this assertion. An incumbent.
licensee and a challenger are two very different. entities. It is simplistic to
think that they can be compared directly on the basis of a single set. of criteria
in order to predict which one is likely to best serve the public interest as a
broadcaster. Rather, these two classes of applicants must be accepted as in-
comparable on the basis of identical criteria, and each must he measured
against the criteria best. suited to predicting its future as a licensee. Only after
these evaluations arc complete should members of each class of applicant be
pined against each other. Admittedly, such a comparison would be highly sub-
jective, but this is the fundamental nature of the choice that the law requires
the FCC to make.
Recognizing the subjectivity of the comparative renewal decisions made
by the FCC, makes the need for increased oversight by the courts more read-
ily apparent. While it is primarily for the Commission, not the court, to fash-
ion and implement licensing policy, it is the duty of the court to oversee the
FCC, and to set aside agency action that is not in compliance with the law. As
Central Florida recognized, an appropriate first step in the court's review func-
tion is to require that the FCC articulate its policy and clearly describe how it
applies that policy in each case.2 " This step alone, however, is not necessar-
ily sufficient to guarantee FCC adherence to the law.
2" Sec text and note at note 203 supra.
454	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol, 21:421
Where the FCC has provided an intelligible explanation for a licensing
decision the court must, as a next step, closely scrutinize the rationale to en-
sure that there are no subtle biases in favor of a particular class of applicants.
While the court in the past has rejected FCC policy pronouncements that ob-
viously favored incumbents over challengers, it has allowed more discreet
policies that have the same effect to stand. 212 If judicial oversight is to be
meaningful, the court must attempt to discover underlying renewal prefer-
ences and• demand that those that are not justifiable he eliminated. The diffi-
culty with this second step is that it to some degree involves the court in policy
matters that have been delegated by Congress to the FCC. Whether the award
of a particular renewal preference represents a reasonable policy judgment or
an illegal bias is often a close question, and some deference should be given to
FCC determinations in this regard. The court, however, cannot abandon its
function of review, and to the extent that review requires the courts to make
subjective evaluations parallel to those of the Commission, it must do so.
Merely because a Commission policy is reasonable, it is not necessarily legal. It
is the obligation of the courts to be the final arbitor of this question.
CONCLUSION
A decade ago in this law review a comment on comparative renewal hear-
ings expressed the hope that WHDH would mark "the beginning of a new
activism on the part of the FCC.' n 213 These hopes, however, were not
realized, as the FCC's failure to stand by WHDH made that decision more an
anomoly than a landmark. In Central Florida the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has indicated a willingness to assume an activist role to
force the Commission to establish the equitable comparative renewal policy it
was unable to forge following WHDH. 2" As a result, in the aftermath of
Central Florida, just as in the days immediately following WHDH, a practical
and fair comparative renewal policy seems within reach.
While it is the function of the FCC to establish a policy, the success or
failure of that policy is dependent upon the willingness of the court to review
agressively agency actions. Because FCC determinations in the comparative
renewal context are necessarily highly subjective, it is essential that the court
actively oversee the Commission. Without the concerted involvement of the
court, the forces that impinge upon the FCC clecisionmaking process, which
have consistently favored 'renewal applicants, are likely to continue to over-
whelm the due process rights of challengers that are provided by the Com-
munications Act. and Ashbacker.
ROBERT W. BUCK
212 Compare Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975), with Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
13 Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and Comparative Broadcast-
ing Hearings, 10 B.C. IND. & Con.	 REv. 943 (1969).
114 See text and notes at notes 197-203 supra.
